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ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on Federal law as it relates to consent to search 
relating to Fourth Amendment privacy in the practice of Digital 
Forensics. In particular, Digital Examiners should be aware of how 
decisions in Federal Court may impact their ability to acquire evidence 
in both civil and criminal settings. Digital Forensics, being a relatively 
new field, is particularly subject to change as cases and appeals are 
decided. This paper provides an overview of relevant case law relating 
to issues in Digital Forensics. More importantly, our research provides 
Digital Forensic Examiners (DFE), as defined by Lonardo, White, and 
Rea (2008, 2009), with scenarios that illustrate the various nuances 
when dealing with the consent to search. From issues of common 
authority, conflicting consent, apparent authority, and voluntary consent, 
our research explores court findings and applies them to practical advice 
and policy formation for DFEs.  
 
Keywords:  digital forensics, case study, consent to search, federal law, fourth 
amendment 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we address current developments in the law relating to third party 
"consent to search" and the Fourth Amendment within the practice of Digital 
Forensics as defined by Lonardo, White, and Rea (2008). The various issues 
relating to third party consent are illustrated through various federal circuit court 
cases and the US Supreme Court and represent the challenges and issues of which 
one needs to be aware. This is critical as the legal environment surrounding 
Digital Forensics is rapidly developing as judges and attorneys undertake a more 
informed technical and legal analysis. For the Digital Forensic Examiner (DFE) 
these cases will provide insights to DFEs how the courts view computer forensics 
by way of evidentiary, fourth amendment and other legal issues raised on appeal.  
We have organized this paper by the primary facets of comment authority, 
conflicting consent, apparent authority, and voluntary consent. Each major topical 
area is discussed with supporting relevant case law to illustrate how the courts 
approach each relevant DFE issue. Please note that given the limited precedent 
regarding the subject matter, courts often rely on analogies that are not computer 
technology based and we do the same. However, we do place it within a DFE 
context. Before proceeding, we need to provide not only our definition of Digital 
Forensic Examiners but also situate it within the context of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
1.1 Defining Digital Forensic Examiners 
The role of Digital Forensic Examiners has increased within legal casework in the 
last ten years. As a result, the scope of the profession, increased salaries, and 
number of examiners has grown immensely due to the need in most evidentiary 
circumstances for expertise in digital media examination (White, Micheletti, & 
Glorfeld, 2008; White, Michelletti, Glorfeld, & Rea, 2006). This increased 
involvement in all facets of law and government has led to challenges for DFEs, 
states, and the courts in determining the nature and definition of the DFE role. 
These challenges require us to examine just what defines a Digital Forensic 
Examiner (DFE). Many researchers have approached the definition, but we will 
follow the definition put forth by Lonardo et al. (2008) because it is used as a 
framework on which state statutes and other accrediting bodies have been 
analyzed: 
 A Digital Examiner deals with extracting, gathering, and 
analyzing data from a computer or computers, networks, and 
other digital media with subsequent preparation of reports and 
opinions of this media for evidentiary or other states purposes 
such as data/digital security, audit, or assessment. [See also 
Lonardo et al. (2009)]. 
 
Although this definition seems straightforward, as the DFE role's purview has 
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expanded into more and more courtrooms, the questions of the breadth of the 
examiner in terms of procurement of evidence have also increased not only in 
terms of the processes in place but also the technology examined. Our focus in 
this paper is the technology because advances have produced situations requiring 
greater and greater levels of expertise in the procurement of both civil and 
criminal evidence and, as a result, created a need to review the relevant court 
opinions on these issues. 
1.2 The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
Digital Forensic Examiners, who are not practicing as officers of the court or in 
other law enforcement roles, are not subject to the Fourth Amendment. However, 
the continued push for "privacy" and "information privacy" has led many 
examiners to include custodial approvals and other "permissions" in their civil 
collection procedures. In this light, the idea of the Fourth Amendment is pervasive 
in the practice of digital forensics and is a focus of our paper. 
In summary, the Fourth Amendment pertains to government activity in searches, 
not those by private parties unless the private party is deemed as an agent for the 
government (i.e. law enforcement.): 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. (Emphasis added) 
The concept of third party consent to search revolves around the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and specifically is concerned as to 
whether the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location that is 
searched ("Katz v. U.S.," 1967). However, the Fourth Amendment does not 
specifically speak of a "reasonable expectation of privacy" because it is a doctrine 
of law set forth by the US Supreme Court (USSC) in cases interpreting whether a 
search is "unreasonable."  
Practice demonstrates that the higher the expectation of privacy, the higher the 
protected rights are from searches, and the higher the likelihood a search warrant 
would be required. The courts analyze the "totality of the circumstances" for each 
case under review ("Illinois v. Rodriguez," 1990). This means that a particular 
court reviews the facts on a case-by-case basis in making a determination whether 
third party consent is valid. As a result, there is no "bright line rule" as to what 
makes a search based on third party consent legal and valid, thereby making this a 
challenge. However, the crux of the question can hinge on situations where 
consent given to law enforcement is found to be knowing and voluntary, thereby 
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not implicating the Fourth Amendment and making the search and/or seizure 
valid ("Schneckloth v. Bustamonte," 1973). 
As a result of the voluntary delineation, one of the most critical focuses in digital 
forensics is the idea of "consent." Consent is most dramatically at the forefront 
when examiners are involved in a situation where a family member or other third 
party "gives permission" to examine another person's media or device. In civil 
examinations, it is common for IT administrators, HR representatives, or other 
members of the corporate management team to grant a Digital Forensic Examiner 
the permission to review or obtain evidence from digital media. In these cases the 
computer and its contents are typically the property of the company or business 
and the employee has no possessory or legal rights.  
However, outside of the corporate content, many questions regarding the nature of 
consent and the right to examine both media and data becomes an issue for the 
DFE. In the following sections we examine cases that detail situations in which 
the express permission of the actual owner of that evidence may not be apparent 
and can hamper the DFE's ability to review and produce usable evidence. 
2. COMMON AUTHORITY 
The concept of common authority directly relates to the idea that multiple parties 
may have access to, or some level of control over, media that is not necessarily 
shared but may be accessed communally. For example, portable media such as a 
USB flash drive that is plugged into a roommate's computer.  
 
Digital Forensics Issue:  If the roommate consents to the examination of his 
personal computer, does this consent include the roommate's USB flash drive 
plugged into the computer? 
 
Common authority might be simply defined as "When a party has free access and 
the authority to enter an area or use an item, that item/area is under common 
authority." The U.S. Supreme Court underscores this definition: 
The authority which justified the third-party consent does not 
rest upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and 
legal refinement, but rests rather on mutual use of the property 
by persons generally having joint access or control for most 
purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-
inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right 
and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their 
number might permit the common area to be searched. ("Georgia 
v. Randolph," 2006) [quoting ("United States v. Matlock," 
1974)] (Emphasis added) 
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2.1 Conflicting Consent and Computer Drives 
However, a critical issue that emerges from this definition is conflicting consent. 
Consider the Georgia v. Randolph ("Georgia v. Randolph," 2006) case: 
Facts: Estranged wife gave police consent to search the home. She previously 
moved in with some relatives for a few weeks and it was not clear whether she 
was moving back permanently to reconcile or was there to pick up personal 
effects. Both the estranged wife and husband were physically present. The 
husband denied consent and the wife granted the consent to search. Police entered 
the home and searched it finding traces of drugs and ultimately obtaining a 
warrant. 
Issue: When a co-tenant objects to a search of an apartment or home in the 
presence of the consenting co-tenant does that objection override the consenting 
party where both have common authority over the premises? 
Court's ruling:  First, the ability to grant consent rests with whether the person 
granting the consent has "common authority" to do so. In other words, does the 
consenting party have free access and authority to certain areas of the home or 
apartment shared by both habitants? Secondly, even if one person has the 
common authority, if the cohabitant with shared common authority and access is 
physically present and refuses to grant the authority then law enforcement must 
abide by the non-consenting cohabitant's wishes.  
 
Digital Forensic Implications:  Thus, Randolph might imply that a 
spouse/partner might be able to grant consent particularly when an item is 
shared or an area of the drive is shared between multiple parties. It would not 
be the case that this would grant consent to search protected or privileged areas 
of the drive or device belonging to a spouse/partner. 
 
However, Randolph would not perhaps cover the aforementioned USB flash drive 
as illustrated in the following case ("United States v. King," 2010) in which a 
non-consenting party's ownership of the hard drive installed in consenting party's 
computer was granted by the third party. 
Facts:  Person who resided with the defendant was arrested and consented to a 
seizure of the personal computer (PC) that she owned. King assisted with the 
surrender by disconnecting the PC. King told police he installed the hard drive on 
the PC and claimed ownership of it. He then asked law enforcement if he could 
remove it as the owner. Police refused his request. In searching the PC certain 
incriminating email correspondence was found between the owner of the PC and 
King. This correspondence led to a search warrant of the defendant's home and 
the seized computer. As a result of this search the police found thousands of 
images of child pornography in addition to the incriminating emails. King 
voluntarily met with police and after several hours admitted having sexual 
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relations with the daughter of the PC owner. Ultimately, King pled guilty for 
having engaged in a sexual act with a person under the age of 12 according to 18 
U.S.C. (UnitedStates, 2010a). Later, King attempted to withdraw his plea, but a 
lower court denied his request.  
Issue:  At issue here is "when an owner of a computer consents to its seizure, does 
that consent include the computer's hard drive even when it was installed by 
another who claims ownership of it and objects to its seizure?" ("United States v. 
King," 2010). 
Court's ruling: The defendant looked to Georgia v. Randolph ("Georgia v. 
Randolph," 2006) as a basis to negate the consent of the PC owner. The Lower 
court relied on United States v. Matlock ("United States v. Matlock," 1974) in its 
decision to uphold the guilty plea and sentencing. The Lower court reasoned that 
both parties had common authority over the PC and its hard drive. The Superior 
court found neither case controlling and stated "the facts of this case place it 
somewhere between those cases" ("United States v. King," 2010). 
The Superior court found that the rule in Randolph ("Georgia v. Randolph," 2006) 
does not go beyond the consent to search a home and does not apply to the 
personal effects within. In this sense, the court follows Andrus' comparison of a 
computer to a container and notes, "A computer is a personal effect" ("United 
States v. Andrus," 2007) [cited in ("United States v. King," 2010)]. In this 
approach the court used the "common authority" rule in Matlock ("United States 
v. Matlock," 1974) in which both parties had access to the PC, shared passwords, 
email accounts etc. Therefore, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy and 
each party had the authority to grant consent regardless of whether one may had 
refused the consent, unlike Randolph ("Georgia v. Randolph," 2006). 
 
Digital Forensic Implications: Returning to our original scenario of 
Roommate A plugging in a USB flash drive into Roommate B's laptop. 
Roommate B gives consent to examine the laptop. Does this consent extend to 
the flash drive?  
 
This would appear to be a similar case to King ("United States v. King," 2010). 
In King, the officers did not permit the owner to remove a hard drive attached 
to a computer, but the drive was permanently installed inside the case. In this 
practical scenario the issue for digital forensic examiners would be whether the 
acquisition of peripherals connected and in a multi-party residence extends to 
multiple roommates sharing one computer/laptop. Thus, this scenario is similar 
to the case of King ("United States v. King," 2010), and DFEs should be able 
to seize all the peripherals attached to a common machine because consent has 
been granted by one of the parties who accesses to the machine. 
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3. APPARENT AUTHORITY 
Moving from the idea of common authority and the communal access to media, 
we now examine the concept of apparent authority and the perception that 
someone has the authority within a particular scenario. In other words, when 
someone has the reasonable belief that they have appropriate authority to conduct 
an examination of certain media based on circumstances presented to him or her, 
they should be permitted to do so. For instance, if a law enforcement officer is 
given consent to examine the media, the officer may assume that person has the 
right to give this consent if the surrounding circumstances presented to the officer 
would lead him/her to reasonably believe that person has the authority to do so, 
even if they are not the actual owner or custodian of the computer or in fact do not 
have actual authority. United States v. Andrus (2007) illustrates factors that must 
be taken into consideration when making this determination.  
 
Digital Forensic Issue:  A partner surrenders a cell phone and indicates that 
the phone may be examined. Subsequently, the partner provides the pin login 
code for the phone to the examiners. 
 
3.1 Password Protected Files 
Facts: Defendant pled guilty to one count of possession of child pornography, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a) (4) (B) (UnitedStates, 2010b). However, he 
retained the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion by the district 
court during an investigation of a third-party billing and credit card company that 
provided subscribers with access to websites containing child pornography. The 
investigation of the company, Regpay, led the Agents of the Bureau of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to investigate the subscribers, one 
of them being the defendant, Ray Andrus.  
Records reflected three people lived at the residence in question, two of which 
were the defendant and his 91-year-old father, Dr. Andrus. The agent and the 
police officer, with a verbal and signed consent, as well as the assistance of Dr. 
Andrus, searched the room of Ray Andrus and analyzed his PC with EnCase 
forensic software (GuidanceSoftware, 2010). This investigation led to the direct 
access of the hard drive. There was no need to determine if the hard drive required 
any user name or password. During this search certain .jpg files where found to 
contain child pornography on the hard drive.  
The search was temporarily suspended when law enforcement discovered this 
was the only PC in the house and that Dr. Andrus was not the likely user. Thus, 
actual authority may not have existed. However, the defendant subsequently gave 
consent when law enforcement confronted him with their discovery. After 
bringing the PC back to law enforcement headquarters it was later discovered 
there was a user profile (with individual user name and password) for Ray 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 6(4) 
 
26 
 
Andrus. 
Issue:  This is a case of "first impression" meaning that this is the first time third 
party consent relating to a computer has been addressed by the 10
th
 Circuit Court 
of Appeals. The issue before the court was whether there was apparent authority 
to consent to the search by the defendant's father. The court needed to consider 
the following information discovered by law enforcement personnel via an 
interview with the third party, Dr. Andrus: 
 Dr. Andrus owned the house and lived there with family 
members. 
 Dr. Andrus' house had Internet access. Dr. Andrus paid the 
Internet and cable bill. 
 The email address associated with Dr. Andrus' account had 
been activated and used to register on a website that provided 
access to child pornography. 
 Ray Andrus lived in the center bedroom. Law enforcement 
also knew that Dr. Andrus had access to the room at will. This 
implied that Dr. Andrus had access to the computer. 
 
Court's ruling: The court in this case stated that where there is either actual or 
apparent authority to consent by a third party based on the totality of the 
circumstances, the consent by the third party would be valid. The court described 
actual authority as follows: 
A third party has actual authority to consent to a search "if that third 
party has either (1) mutual use of the property by virtue of joint access, 
or (2) control for most purposes" ("United States v. Andrus," 2007) 
[See also Matlock where holding "common authority over or other 
sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be 
inspected" may give rise to a third party's valid consent to search 
("United States v. Matlock," 1974).]  
 
Where actual authority may be lacking apparent authority will suffice as stated 
by the court: 
Whether apparent authority exists is an objective, totality-of-the-
circumstances inquiry into whether the facts available to the officers at 
the time they commenced the search would lead a reasonable officer to 
believe the third party had authority to consent to the search. ("Illinois 
v. Rodriguez," 1990) ["[W]here an officer is presented with ambiguous 
facts related to authority, he or she has a duty to investigate further 
before relying on the consent." ("United States v. Kimoana," 2004).]  
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Given the above findings, we must consider the following factors when 
examining third party consent and how it applies within apparent authority in the 
examination of digital media.  If law enforcement has knowledge or reasonably 
suspects that files are password protected, then the third party consent would not 
be valid. Password protection implies a high degree of expectation of privacy. 
However if law enforcement sees no perceived protection relating to computer 
access the court states that "under our case law, however, officers are not 
obligated to ask questions unless the circumstances are ambiguous ("United States 
v. Kimoana," 2004). In short, if law enforcement reasonably believes apparent 
authority exists, they have no affirmative duty to inquire further regarding 
password-protected files. The court rejected the dissent's opinion asserting that it 
is typical for computers to have password protection. Since there was no data or 
facts on the record to substantiate this, the court did not go further into this 
inquiry.  
Therefore, we would argue that if the physical location of the computer is such 
that a reasonable person would believe other members of the household had 
common access to the computer, including the third party, the consent might be 
valid. However if the third party disclaims access to the computer or files even if 
the computer is in a common area, third party consent might not be valid. 
("Trulock v. Freeh," 2001) 
 
Digital Forensic Implication:  In our practical example of one partner turning 
over his/her partner's cell phone and the pin code number the examiner of the 
phone could reasonably assume that the person has the authority to consent to a 
search of the phone. However, if the examiner had doubts (viz. the name on the 
phone or other information), he/she would be obligated to further investigate 
before assuming that there was authority to consent. 
        
4. THIRD PARTY OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN PREMISES AND 
COMMON AUTHORITY 
Conflating common authority and potential apparent authority, we must consider 
the scenario with multiple partners in residence who might jointly use a particular 
piece of technology. This idea is typical with one party being the "owner" and the 
other party residing in the residence. A common example would be a computer in 
a dorm room owned by one roommate but used by others in the same area. In this 
section we examine a case ("United States v. Nichols," 2009) that illustrates 
factors that must be considered when making this determination. 
 
Digital Forensics Issue:  Can the examiner seize a laptop found in an 
apartment with consent from a third party who does not own the property, but 
is at the residence? 
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Facts: Defendant Nichols lived with his girlfriend and her seven year old daughter 
in a house owned solely by defendant. Girlfriend had lived in the home for past 
three months, paying bills and receiving mail at the home. Moreover, she had 
unrestricted access to the house and property in the house, including defendant's 
computer. The girlfriend found an unlabeled computer disc with sexually explicit 
photos of her daughter and gave the disc to the police. Based on the contents of 
the disc, the police obtained a search warrant for Nichols' computer and found 
matching sexually explicit photos as were on the computer disc.  
Issue:  Defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress 
evidence obtained during the search of his home and computer. He claimed the 
search was not authorized by a warrant. Defendant also asserted that his 
girlfriend, who lived in Nichols' home but did not own the property, did not have 
the authority to consent to a search of Nichols' home and computer.  
Court's Ruling:  The court cited Matlock which states that a "warrantless search is 
valid where the consent to search is from a third party who possesses common 
authority over the premises or effects" ("United States v. Matlock," 1974). 
Common authority is described as a question of fact determined by factors such as 
mutual use, joint access, and control ("United States v. Almeida Perez," 2008).  
In this case, the girlfriend was a co-occupant of the home, enjoying unrestricted 
access to the house and the computer. The court found that the girlfriend occupied 
the house as a possessor, giving the girlfriend the authority to consent to the 
search of the home and the computer. 
In addition to common authority, the Court stated the girlfriend had "apparent 
authority." Such authority is present when the "facts available to the officer at the 
moment…warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting 
party had authority over the premises" ("United States v. Almeida Perez," 2008). 
In this situation the defendant's girlfriend met the police at the door of the home, 
appeared familiar with the house, and freely operated the computer. These facts 
suggest that the defendant's girlfriend is an occupant of the house capable of 
granting consent. 
The court did not address Nichol's claim that the police did not have a warrant, 
but included in the facts portion of the opinion that police had obtained a warrant 
prior to searching the home.  
 
Digital Forensics Implication:  In our laptop example, if the person granting 
access was a resident of the apartment, even if they were not necessarily the 
owner/rent payer, they would have the common authority to grant access to the 
laptop under this case as well as the other cases cited in this paper, particularly 
apparent authority. 
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5. VOLUNTARY CONSENT 
In this section we revisit the issue of passwords and the associated privacy 
expectations in the context of the Fourth Amendment and its application within a 
technological framework. Most illustrative of a potential scenario is the high-
profile case of the United States v. Trulock ("United States v. Notra Trulock, 
Linda Conrad," 2001). 
 
Digital Forensics Issue:  One of the more common challenges hinges on the 
ability of one party to give the password for another party in a case. This 
happens often in an organizational situation when one person provides the 
password for another employee's desktop. 
 
5.1 Search of Password Protected Files 
Facts:  Notra Trulock served as Director of Intelligence for the Department of 
Energy (DOE) and later as the Director of the Office of Counter Intelligence. 
Trulock alleged that he found evidence of a serious security breach at the Los 
Alamos weapons Nuclear Laboratory by Chinese spies. He further alleged that the 
CIA ignored his repeated warnings about the breach.  
The breach was eventually made known to Congress and Trulock testified at 
congressional hearings. Sometime later Trulock was demoted at DOE and 
ultimately forced out in 1999. He documented the security breach and the "blind 
eye" of the CIA in a manuscript later published in the National Review (Trulock, 
2000a). Trulock contended that the government retaliated because of his 
published account of the issues. 
Trulock lived in a townhouse along with property owner Linda Conrad, a co-
complainant. Conrad was Executive Assistant to Trulock during his tenure at 
DOE. She then reported to Trulock's successor Lawrence Sanchez. On July 14, 
2000 Conrad alleged that Sanchez told her the FBI wanted to question her about 
Trulock and informed her that FBI agents had a warrant to search the townhouse. 
Moreover she claimed that Sanchez told her the agents would "break down the 
front door in the presence of the media if she refused to cooperate" (Trulock, 
2000b). 
Two FBI agents arrived at the DOE and escorted Conrad to a conference room. 
Agents were armed but did not display their weapons. During the three-hour 
interview there were no allegations of raised voices or threats, but at some point 
Conrad wished to make or answer phone calls. The record is unclear whether or 
not agents told her she could or could not make the calls. 
During the interview agents questioned Conrad about Trulock's personal records 
and computer files. Conrad told agents she shared a computer with him, but each 
maintained separate password protected files on the hard drive. Conrad noted that 
they did not know each other's passwords and could not access each other's files. 
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Agents gave Conrad a consent form and asked her to sign. There was no mention 
of a search warrant or threat to "break down the door."  Conrad alleged she was 
both crying and shaking. At the townhouse, Trulock asked to see the search 
warrant and agents told him Conrad had signed consent paperwork to search. 
Agents searched the computer files for 90 minutes, including Trulock's password 
protected files. The agents took custody of the hard drive before leaving the 
townhouse.    
Issues: A number of claims were presented by plaintiffs, including two important 
questions: 
1. Was Conrad's consent involuntary?  
2. Was Conrad's consent, if voluntary, sufficient to permit the 
search of Trulock's private computer files? 
 
Court's Ruling:  Two major issues the court considered focused on voluntary 
consent first of the warrant and second of the computer search of password 
protected files. Under ("Schneckloth v. Bustamonte," 1973), valid consent is 
recognized as an exception to the Fourth Amendment prohibition against 
warrantless searches. However, consent to search is valid only if the consent was 
knowing and voluntary under the "totality of the circumstances" test ("United 
States v. Mendenhall," 1980). 
In this case, the court found Conrad's consent to be invalid under the "Bumper" 
rationale, which states, "the acquiescence to an assertion of lawful authority does 
not constitute an understanding, intentional and voluntary waiver of rights under 
the 4
th
 amendment…where there is coercion there cannot be consent" ("Bumper 
v. North Carolina," 1968).  
Agents conducting the townhouse search never claimed to have a warrant; 
however, Sanchez told Conrad the FBI possessed a warrant. The court found 
Sanchez conveyed this message at the behest of the FBI and was acting in concert 
with the FBI. Based on these facts, Conrad's consent was found to be involuntary. 
(Despite this finding by the Court, the agents were found to have qualified 
immunity.) 
In terms of the computer search, plaintiffs contended that the search of Trulock's 
password protected computer files violated the Fourth Amendment. The court, 
already having found Conrad's consent to be involuntary, determined that even if 
consent had been voluntary, Conrad was not authorized to consent to a search of 
Trulock's password protected files.  
In its findings, the court stated that valid third party consent must pass a two-
prong test. First, the third party must have the authority to consent and second, the 
consent must be voluntary. Authority to consent is found by "mutual use of the 
property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so 
that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to 
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permit the inspection in his own right and that others have assumed the risk that 
one of their number might permit the common area to be searched" ("United 
States v. Matlock," 1974). 
Ultimately, the court found Conrad lacked the authority to properly consent to a 
search of Trulock's password protected files. Despite mutual use of the computer 
kept in Conrad's bedroom, both Conrad and Trulock kept their files separate, as 
well as protected by passwords and neither of them disclosed their passwords to 
each other. While the court recognized that Conrad had the authority to consent to 
a general search of the computer, her authority "did not extend to Trulock's 
password protected files" ("Trulock v. Freeh," 2001). 
To make this determination the court relied on the Block case ("United States v. 
Block," 1978). In this case, the Block court held that the defendant's mother had 
authority to consent to a search of defendant's room in the home they shared, but 
the authority did not extend to a "locked footlocker located within the room. The 
authority to consent cannot be thought automatically to extend to the interiors of 
every discrete enclosed space capable of search within the area…the rule has to 
be one of reason that assesses the critical circumstances indicating the presence or 
absence of a discrete expectation of privacy with respect to the particular object" 
("United States v. Block," 1978). 
In its decision, the court considered Trulock's password protected files to be 
analogous to Block's locked footlocker. By using a password, Trulock 
affirmatively intended to exclude Conrad and others from his personal files. Thus, 
Trulock had a reasonable expectation of privacy for the password-protected files 
and Conrad's authority did not extend to them. (Despite this finding, the Court 
again found qualified immunity for the actions of the agents in the improper 
search.)  
 
Digital Forensics Implications:  Thus, it would appear that if another party 
provides the password, it would be a violation on any files/areas protected by 
that password so long as the items weren't shared. If the items were shared 
(even with different logins) it would seem that the search could proceed. 
 
6. OVERALL POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
We would be remiss not to stress the need for Digital Forensic Examiners (DFE) 
and law enforcement to communicate frequently with one another to promote 
knowledge exchange. It is one of the most effective means to bridge procedural 
gaps between the two areas as they increasingly work in conjunction with each 
other in diverse cases. This is especially important because as more DFEs enter 
the profession from non-law enforcement backgrounds, we will experience an 
increase in privacy violations that will lead to evidence challenges in court. 
Ultimately, it is imperative for Digital Forensic Examiners (DFE) to set policies in 
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order to ensure privacy in each individual case to minimize the impact of privacy 
violations. We recommend that several key policies areas must be implemented: 
 
1. The recovery of password-protected files should only be 
conducted with the express consent of the owner of the file 
(the person who created the password). 
2. Seizure of peripherals should be acceptable even if the 
peripheral belongs to a third party as long as it is attached to 
the seized device. 
3. Third parties should be able to provide consent for devices that 
are located in common areas. 
4. Third parties should be able to provide consent for files that 
are in shared media space. 
 
While we realize that these rules apply specifically to law enforcement, it prudent 
to implement these guidelines to receive consent in the same context in civil 
investigations to avoid later challenges to collected evidence. 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have provided several United States Federal courts' key cases that 
can provide direction to the DFE practitioner. In our research we argue that DFEs 
should be aware of how decisions in various Federal Courts may impact their 
ability to acquire evidence in both civil and criminal settings. Digital Forensics, 
being a relatively new field, is particularly subject to changing and evolving law 
as cases and appeals are decided. We have found that as the field develops, judges 
and attorneys are undertaking a more informed technical and legal analysis.  
While these cases apply to law enforcement, it is prudent for practicing DFE 
professionals to be aware of challenges that may emerge against procured digital 
evidence. This is particularly applicable to private investigators practicing Digital 
Forensics who will frequently encounter diverse types of consent situations. 
Ultimately, our research provides critical insight to Digital Examiners on how the 
courts view computer forensics by way of evidentiary, fourth amendment and 
other legal issues brought on appeal. Given the limited precedent regarding the 
subject matter, courts often rely on analogies that are not computer technology 
based. Through our research, we were able to apply an analysis of these cases into 
the technical realm.  
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